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NOTES
Constitutional Law-Self-Censorship After Herbert v. Lando:
The Need for Special Pre-Trial Procedure in
Defamation Action
In its landmark 1964 decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,I the
Supreme Court found an inherent conflict between the protection of
private reputational interests through the defamation action and the
right to freedom of the press under the first amendment. Although it
was settled that the first amendment did not protect false publications,
the Court found that the fear of huge damage judgments under state
defamation law caused potential defamation defendants to refrain from
publishing statements they believed in good faith to be true. The Court
refused to abolish defamation actions to prevent this self-censorship,
but it also refused to ignore the infringement of the first amendment
caused by the threat of such actions. To balance reputational and first
amendment interests, the Court added subjective fault-knowing or
reckless disregard of the truth-as a constitutionally required essential
element of state defamation actions.2
Fifteen years later, in Herbert v. Lando,3 the Supreme Court con-
sidered the conflict of reputational and first amendment interests inher-
ent in pre-trial discovery requests precipitated by defamation actions.
In Herbert, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that in a defamation action the first amendment requires an abso-
lute privilege against discovery of a journalist's thoughts, opinions,
conclusions, and editorial conversations concerning the allegedly de-
famatory publication.4 Thus, the court deprived plaintiff of the most
direct evidence of the journalist's subjective fault,5 or reckless disregard
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id. at 277-83.
3. 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979). The decision is noted at 66 CAL.
L. REV. 1127,78 COLUM. L. Rv. 448,9 Cum. L. Rev. 277,47 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 286,73 Nw. L.
REXV. 583, 13 TULSA L. REV. 837,47 U.Mo.-K.C.L. REv. 273,31 VAND. L. REv. 375. See Bezan-
son, Herbert v. Lando, Editorial Judgment and Freedom of the Press: An Essay, 1978 U. ILL. L.F.
605.
4. 568 F.2d at 975.
5. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the United States Supreme Court de-
fined the defamation fault standard in actions by public figures, see note 4 infra, as the defendant's
"entertaining serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id. at 731. Thus, the defendant's
thoughts and opinions are the most conclusive evidence on the issue of fault. Subjective fault in
defamation actions is traditionally termed "actual malice.' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
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of the truth, which a public figure defamation plaintiff is constitution-
ally required to prove.6 The court allowed plaintiff to discover only
objective evidence of the journalist's awareness of falsity, from which
plaintiff could build a circumstantial case.7 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and allowed com-
plete discovery of defamation defendants within the traditional limits
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 Because the Second Circuit
privilege made defamation recovery unlikely, the Court found it incon-
sistent with the commitment to the vitality of the defamation action
U.S. 254 (1964). Because "actual malice" commonly means ill will or spite, however, the term has
caused significant confusion. Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 1661 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing).
6. The Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), held that a
public official must prove knowing or reckless disregard of the truth to prevail in a defamation
action. The Times rule was extended to "public figures" in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967). Plaintiff Herbert conceded his status as a public figure, Herbert v. Lando, 73
F.R.D. 387, 391 (1977), rev'd, 568 F.2d 974 (1977), aj'd, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979). In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court held that those who are not public figures must prove
at least negligence to recover in a defamation action. In Herbert, the Court did not reach the
question of editorial privilege in Gertz actions. 99 S. Ct. at 1651. Because evidence of the defend-
ant's thoughts and opinions is not as crucial to a negligence case, Herbert might not have ruled out
the Second Circuit's privilege or a similar first amendment protection in Gertz actions.
7. The Second Circuit said plaintiff
has already discovered what [defendant] Lando knew, saw, said and wrote during his
investigation. As we noted before, the deposition of Lando produced a massive tran-
script documenting in minute detail the course of Lando's research. The jury is free to
infer from Lando's use and application of the extensive materials discovered, and,
equally important, from the failure to heed certain contradictory information. If it
chooses to do so .... it can find that Lando acted with actual malice or reckless disre-
gard of the truth.
568 F.2d at 984.
By contrast, "direct discovery" is exemplified by the following questions cited by the Supreme
Court in Herbert.
Did you ever come to a conclusion that it was unnecessary to talk to Capt. Laurence
Potter prior to the presentation of the program on February 4th?
Did you ever come to the conclusion that you did not want to have a filmed inter-
view with Sgt. Cannon for the program?
When you prepared the final draft of the program to be aired, did you form any
conclusion as to whether one of the matters presented by that program was Col. Her-
bert's view of the treatment of the Vietnamese?
Do you have any recollection of discussing with anybody at CBS whether that se-
quence should be excluded from the program as broadcast?
Prior to the publication of the Atlantic Monthly article, Mr. Lando, did you discuss
that article or the preparation of that article with any representative of CBS?
99 S. Ct. at 1662 n.2 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
8. Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979). The Court reiterated its commitment, expressed
in Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964) and Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501,
507 (1947), to a liberal construction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to discov-
ery. The Court noted, however, that the relevancy standard of Rule 26(b)(1) should be "firmly
applied" and that district court powers to curtail abusive discovery should not be neglected. 99 S.
Ct. at 1649; see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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displayed in New York Times v. Sullivan.9
Although rejection of the Second Circuit privilege is consistent
with New York Times, the failure of the Supreme Court to fashion an-
other remedy for the first amendment chills caused by unfettered
discovery clearly betrays the New York Times commitment to "unin-
hibited, robust and wide-open" debate.' 0 Herbert v. Lando differs from
New York Times only in that the self-censorship challenged in Herbert
resulted from the threat of defamation discovery, while in New York
Times self-censorship resulted from the threat of defamation judg-
ments. As New York Times brought to light the substantive chill on
first amendment rights resulting from strict liability, Herbert puts in
issue the procedural chill resulting from unfettered discovery. Thus,
adherence to the New York Times principle requires a remedy to dispel
that procedural chill. As in New York Times that remedy cannot de-
stroy protection of reputational interests but must nonetheless ensure
the vigorous exercise of first amendent rights. This Note explores the
need for a special pre-trial procedure that would balance conflicting
reputational and first amendment interests in defamation actions and
then outlines the mechanics of the procedure.
Plaintiff in Herbert v. Lando, Colonel Anthony Herbert, rose to
national prominence" when, after being relieved of his duties in Viet-
nam, he publicly accused superior officers of covering up war crimes
and atrocities he claimed to have witnessed in Vietnam and reported to
the proper authorities. 2 In 1972, CBS aired a segment of its regular
news program "60 Minutes" recounting the Herbert incident and chal-
lenging the veracity of Herbert's story.'3 Barry Lando produced and
Mike Wallace narrated the show. Lando also published an article in
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. 376 U.S. at 270.
11. Herbert's story fascinated an American public that was increasingly becoming dis-
enchanted by the Viet Nam War. In July 1971, he was interviewed by Life Magazine;
that September, James Wooten of the New York Times wrote an article favorable to
Herbert entitled "How a Super-soldier was Fired from His Command." Interviews with
television personality Dick Cavett followed which, according to Cavett, elicited a level of
viewer response unmatched by any other single program. In October 1971, Congress
became embroiled in the 'Herbert affair' when Rep. F. Edward Heber, Chairman of the
Armed Services Committee, convinced the Army to remove Herbert's poor efficiency
report from his military record.
568 F.2d at 981.
12. Id. at 980-81. Herbert was apparently dismissed because of his persistence in urging an
investigation. Ultimately the investigation exonerated General Barnes, the brigade commander
Herbert charged with ignoring his reports. Id.
13. The segment was entitled "The Selling of Colonel Herbert." Id. at 982.
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Atlantic Monthly based on the information gathered for the show.14
Herbert brought a $44 million defamation action against Lando,
Wallace, CBS, and Atlantic Monthly for damages to his reputation and
to the value of his own account, Soldier.'5 Herbert alleged that "the
program and the article maliciously portrayed him as a liar, one who
had committed acts of brutality and atrocities in Viet Nam and an op-
portunist seeking to use the war crimes issue to cover his own alleged
failures in the Army."' 16
Herbert engaged in massive pre-trial discovery. "Lando's deposi-
tion alone continued intermittently for over a year, filled 26 volumes
containing nearly 3,000 pages and 240 exhibits."' 7 Nonetheless, Lando
refused to answer "a small number of questions relating to his beliefs,
opinions, intent and conclusions in preparing the program," including
those he previously expressed to Wallace.'" The district court ordered
Lando to answer the disputed questions because "the defendant's state
of mind is of central importance to a proper resolution of the merits."19
On interlocutory review, a split panel of the Second Circuit re-
versed the district court order on the ground that it would chill the
exercise of first amendment rights.2" Because the defamation fault
standard is defined as the defendant's "entertaining serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication," 2' the court reasoned that defendants
would be foolish to discuss candidly the accuracy of the potential
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 568 F.2d 974 (1977), a 'd,
99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).
17. 99 S. Ct. at 1649 n.25.
18. 568 F.2d at 982-83.
These assertedly objectionable inquiries can be grouped into five categories:
1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations regarding people or
leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the '60 Minutes'
segment and the Atlantic Monthly article;
2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his state of mind
with respect to the veracity of persons interviewed;
3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a conclusion
concerning the veracity of persons, information or events;
4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or ex-
cluded from the broadcast publication; and
5. Lando's intentions as manifested by his decision to include or exclude certain
material.
Id.
19. 73 F.R.D. at 395.
20. 568 F.2d 984. Chief Judge Kaufman and Judge Oakes, writing separate opinions, formed
the majority. Judge Meskill dissented.
21. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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story. 2 The court considered the interchange of editorial judgment,
however, to be the "sine qua non of responsible journalism," which
should, therefore, be protected by an absolute privilege.2 3 Second, the
court found the prospect of extensive defamation discovery likely to
discourage aggressive journalism: "Faced with the possibility of such
an inquisition. . . [journalists] would be chilled in the very process of
thought . . . .The tendency would be to follow the safe course of
avoiding contention and controversy."' 4 The court relied heavily on
recent cases forbidding governmental interference with prepublication
editorial decision-making.25 The court found that by allowing defama-
tion discovery, which is costly and intrusive, the state encourages self-
censorship and accomplishes indirectly what it is not allowed to accom-
plish directly. 6
22. 568 F.2d at 980.
23. Id. While Judge Kaufman emphasized the accuracy of the editorial product, Judge
Oakes offered yet another rationale. He noted that the free speech clause protects the expres-
sion-the product of the journalistic endeavor-but the free press clause also protects the institu-
tional process whereby the press fulfills its informational and critical function. Judge Oakes relied
primarily on Justice Stewart's seminal article, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975):
The structural or institutional aspect of the Free Press guarantee is not, as Justice
Stewart points out, some filigree added at the final stages of the design by the architects
of the Constitution. Rather it is at the core of the construct, vital to the tensile integrity
of our government. . . .To the extent that the independent exercise of editorial func-
tions is threatened by governmental action, the very foundations of the architectural
masterpiece that is our form bf government are shaken, the supporting columns weak-
ened.
568 F.2d at 988. In dissent, Judge Meskill pointed out that the Supreme Court has called freedom
of the press a fundamental personal right and thus considers the two clauses identical. 568 F.2d at
997. The Supreme Court did not broach the free press clause issue in Herbert. The Court's hold-
ing, however, showed that it would protect the editorial process only when absolutely necessary to
protect the editorial product. See, e.g., note 45 infra.
24. 568 F.2d at 984.
25. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Court unanimously
held that the state could not force a newspaper to publish replies to its editorial expressions. In
Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the Court had
previously held that the first amendment does not require broadcasters to accept paid political
advertising. The Court observed, "For better or worse, editing is what editors are for;, and editing
is selection and choice of material." Id. at 420-21. Thus, censorship is state interference in choice
and selection of editorial material. See note 26 infra.
26. "It is clear. . . that newsgathering and dissemination can be subverted by indirect, as
well as direct, restraints." 568 F.2d at 979. The Second Circuit's position was that self-censorship
caused by state defamation actions is state interference with the editorial process. "The broad
discovery order in this case operates after publication to deter free editorial choice concerning
subsequent publications." Id. at 989 n.18 (Oakes, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
The Second Circuit position is analagous to the holding of the Supreme Court in New York
Times that strict liability defamation actions abridge the first aniendment because they operate
after publication to deter free editorial choice in subsequent publications. See notes 182 and
accompanying text supra. The Times Court also reasoned that a state may not accomplish indi-
rectly what it is forbidden to do directly. However, rather than beginning with the premise that
governmental prior restraint is unconstitutional, see note 25 supra, the Court premised its holding
on the presumed unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596, which forbade defa-
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Unpersuaded by the Second Circuit's reasoning, the Supreme
Court reversed. Writing for the majority of six,27 Justice White gave
three reasons for rejecting the absolute privilege delineated by the Sec-
ond Circuit. First, he pointed out that New York Times and successive
cases28 had allowed free inquiry into the editorial process and, there-
fore, had impliedly held discovery of the editorial process to be consis-
tent with the first amendment.29 Rejecting the Second Circuit's holding
that recent prior restraint cases implied the unconstitutionality of edito-
rial discovery, Justice White wrote, "it is incredible to believe that the
Court [in the prior restraint cases] silently effected a substantial con-
traction of the rights preserved to defamation plaintiffs in Sullivan,
Butts and like cases."3 Second, Justice White expressed concern that
the boundaries of the Second Circuit privilege would be difficult to de-
fine. Such an amorphous concept, he feared, might be stretched to in-
dude virtually all discovery by the defamation plaintiff and destroy his
chance of recovery.'
Justice White's primary criticism was that the privilege, even if
narrowly defined, would be an overwhelming obstacle to recovery by
the defamation plaintiff, whom he considered handicapped enough by
having to prove, with convincing clarity,32 knowing and reckless disre-
gard of the truth. Although Justice White acknowledged the impor-
tance of the first amendment rights that are affected by a defamation
action, he noted that "the individual's interest in his reputation is also a
basic concern. . . . [and] it is plain enough that the suggested privilege
for the editorial process would constitute a substantial interference with
mation of the United States government and provided criminal penalties therefore. "What a state
may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach
of its civil law of libel." 376 U.S. at 273-79. Of course, self-censorship caused by threat of crimi-
nal penalty is an "indirect" governmental restraint as compared to the true "prior restraints" dis-
cussed at note 25 supra.
27. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stewart dissented.
28. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967).
29. The Court stated: "In Butts, for example, it is evident from the record that the editorial
process had been subjected to close examination and that direct as well as indirect evidence was
relied on to prove that the defendant magazine had acted with actual malice." 99 S. Ct. at 1641.
The Court also pointed out that Gertz was announced simultaneously with Tornillo, which was
relied on by the Second Circuit, see note 25 supra, and "there was no hint that a companion case
had narrowed the evidence available to a defamation plaintiff. Quite the opposite inference is to
be drawn from the Gertz opinion, since it, like prior First Amendment libel cases, recited without
criticism the facts of record indicating that the state of mind of the editor had been placed at
issue." 99 S. Ct. at 1645.
30. 99 S. Ct. at 1645; see note 29 supra.
31. 99 S. Ct. at 1646.
32. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
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the ability of the defamation plaintiff to establish the ingredients of
malice [subjective fault] as required by New York Times."33 Thus, Jus-
tice White apparently embraced the trial court's position that if the
"plaintiff is denied discovery into areas which in the nature of the case
lie solely with the defendant, then the law in effect provides an arras
behind which malicious publication may go undetected and unpun-
ished."34
Justice White did not consider the two "chills" found by the Sec-
ond Circuit to be worthy of a remedy. Although he conceded the Sec-
ond Circuit's correlation of editorial interchange and accurate news
accounts, he did not concede that discovery of editorial conversation
would decrease accuracy. Rather, he felt that a strong defamation ac-
tion enhanced by plaintiffs access to editorial conversation would en-
sure accuracy. "[G]iven exposure to liability when there is knowing or
reckless error, there is even more reason to resort to prepublication pre-
cautions, such as frank interchange of fact and opinion."'35
In response to the Second Circuit's finding that defamation discov-
ery forces journalists to avoid contention and controversy, Justice
White found that direct discovery of subjective fault was no more
chilling than indirect discovery.
[O]ur cases necessarily contemplate examination of the editorial
process to prove the necessary awareness of probable falsehood, and
if indirect proof of this element does not stifle truthful publication
and is consistent with the First Amendment, as respondents seem to
concede, we do not understand how direct inquiry with respect to the
ultimate issue would be substantially more suspect.36
Further, said Justice White, even if a general discovery chill were
established, it would be the result of discovery abuse "not peculiar to
the libel and slander area."37 Such a chill could be remedied either by
"major changes in the present rules of civil procedure which are be-
yond the power of the judiciary to effect," or by "complete immunity
from liability [for] defamation,"38 a position rejected in New York
33. 99 S. Ct. at 1645-46. The Court was so loath to infringe further on reputational interests
that it stated that it would put additional burdens on the defamation plaintiff only if a "clear and
convincing case were made." Id. at 1646. Even though "it may be that plaintiffs will rarely be
successful in proving awareness of falsehood from the mouth of the defendant himself," id., the
Court believed the negative impact on reputational interests would not be outweighed by the
positive impact on first amendment interests afforded by the privilege.
34. 73 F.R.D. at 394.
35. 99 S. Ct. at 1648.
36. Id. at 1647.
37. Id. at 1649.
38. Id. Justice Powell, concurring, and Justices Marshall and Stewart in dissent offered self-
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Times. Simply stated, Justice White's analysis was that in defamation
actions such as Herbert there is no first amendment chill at all, or in the
alternative, there is a chill irremediable in defamation actions alone.
The absolute privilege accorded defendants in such actions by the Sec-
ond Circuit, therefore, is either an unnecessary remedy or an inade-
quate one for an imperfection in our system of civil procedure.
The Supreme Court's rejection in Herbert of the absolute editorial
privilege is merely the logical result of the New York Times decision to
preserve the defamation action as a protector of the individual's inter-
est in his reputation. In New York Times, concurring Justices Black,
Goldberg, and Douglas39 argued strongly that public officials should
have no recourse to defamation actions, except to vindicate themselves
from attacks related solely to their private affairs, because the framers
of the first amendment conceived of the Fourth Estate as a check on the
other three.40 Public officials accept this unfettered criticism as a condi-
tion of the office.4 Moreover, public officials, as newsmakers, have ac-
cess to the news media for self-help.42 Impli~it in the concurring
justices' argument was the assumption that the national interest in jour-
nalistic criticism of government outweighs the interests of public offi-
cials in their reputations. In allowing a defamation action, however,
censorship remedies between these two extremes. Powell wrote "to emphasize the additional point
that, in supervising discovery in a libel suit by a public figure, a district court has a duty to con-
sider First Amendment interests as well as the private interests of the plaintiffs." Id. at 1650.
Because of the "widespread abuse of discovery," id. at 1650, Powell believed that "when a discov-
ery demand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a district court should measure the
degree of relevance required in light of both the private needs of the parties and the public con-
cerns implicated." Id. at 1651. Justice Marshall would have required, "to protect the press from
unnecessarily protracted or tangential inquiry ... .a strict standard of relevance." To accom-
plish "some constraints on roving discovery," Marshall would have held that "the broad discovery
principles. . . are inapposite in defamation cases." Id. at 1664-65. Justice Stewart would have
lessened the discovery burden on the plaintiff by holding that evidence sought to show defendant's
motivation or reasons for publishing is irrelevant. .d. at 1661.
39. Justices Black and Goldberg wrote concurring opinions, and Justice Douglas joined in
both. 376 U.S. at 293-305.
40. Id. at 295-97, 304. None of the Justices believed the subjective fault standard would
allow the vigorous criticism guaranteed by the first amendment. Calling the Court's holding a
"stopgap measure," id. at 295, Justice Black wrote that
"Malice," even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and
hard to disprove. The requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent
protection for the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure
up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment.
Id. at 293. Justice Goldberg added, "If liability can attach to political criticism because it dam-
ages the reputation of a public official as a public official, then no critical citizen can safely utter
anything but faint praise against the government or its officials." ld. at 304.
41. Id. at 296 (Black, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 304-05 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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the New York Times majority refused to sacrifice the reputations of
public officials and instead compromised first amendment rights.
In Herbert, the Court reasoned that if the defamation action is to
be a potent protector of reputational interests it must offer a chance for
recovery sufficient to entice plaintiffs to use it. Although it is unclear
just how much an absolute privilege diminishes recovery chances, 3 it is
clear that an absolute privilege would make the defamation action
unattractive to a potential plaintiff. As Justice Brennan pointed out in
his dissent in Herbert, "It would be anomalous to turn substantive lia-
bility on a journalist's subjective attitude and at the same time to shield
from disclosure the most direct evidence of that attitude."44
The Supreme Court's refusal to remedy the chill on editorial con-
versation found by the Second Circuit in Herbert is also consistent with
the New York Times commitment to the vitality of the defamation ac-
tion. Given a choice between promoting accuracy of publication either
by privileging a defendant's editorial conversations or by arming a
plaintiff with evidence from editorial interchange, the Court chose the
latter. The Court was not concerned with the effect of its choice on the
editorial product because it assumed that the accuracy of the editorial
product would be the same either way.a' Even if candid interchange is
curbed, a strong defamation action remains a powerful incentive for
journalists to find other ways to ensure accuracy.46
While the Herbert Court's treatment of the absolute privilege and
the editorial conversation chill is at least consistent with New York
Times, its analysis of the first amendment chill caused by the discovery
43. The majority admitted that the plaintiff might prove "awareness of falsehood from the
mouth of the defendant himself' only on rare occasions. 99 S. Ct. at 1646.
44. Id. at 1657.
45. The court's handling of the editorial conversation chill is a prime example of the impor-
tance of the debate, see note 23 supra, over the meaning of the free press clause. If the free press
clause protects the editorial process without regard to an analysis of the effect an intrusion would
have on the editorial product, then the inhibition of editorial conversation violates the first
amendment per se.
46. Justice Brennan called this a "curious observation," 99 S. Ct. at 1659, and added, "Be-
cause such 'prepublication precautions' will often prove to be extraordinarily damaging evidence
in libel actions, I cannot so blithely assume such 'precautions' will be instituted, or that such 'frank
interchange' as now exists is not impaired by its potential exposure in such actions." Id. Doubt-
ing the majority's premise, both Brennan and Marshall argued that editorial conversations deserve
a privilege analogous to executive privilege. Id. at 1658, 1666. Brennan would have allowed a
qualified privilege, id. at 1660, while Marshall argued that only an absolute privilege would be
effective, id. at 1666.
Beyond the question of accuracy, a rule that forces journalists to testify against each other
might well be a disincentive to their pursuing controversial cases that might put them in this
dilemma. The resulting self-censorship is similar to that caused by other potential costs of discov-
ery such as time and money. See text accompanying notes 49-54 infra.
1980] 1033
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [
process is not. The New York Times Court held strict liability defama-
tion actions unconstitutional because they tended to cause self-censor-
ship of the truth.47 The gravamen of the Second Circuit's rationale in
Herbert was that the prospect of abusive defamation discovery tends to
cause self-censorship of the truth.4" As one commentator has put it,
"The trouble with the Times privilege is that it operates at the wrong
end of the litigation. In order to effectively prevent self-censorship, it
would have to operate at the beginning, protecting the press not only
from the threat of eventual liability, but also from expensive litiga-
tion. 49
. Self-censorship is produced by the journalist's fear of two related
but distinct costs of defamation discovery-time and money. As evi-
denced by Lando's lengthy deposition,50 the journalist's personal in-
volvement in defamation discovery can be quite substantial. A
journalist contemplating publication of a controversial story must con-
sider the time that litigation may take away from the advancement of
his career through the pursuit of other stories. If the journalist is self-
employed or his employer cannot or will not pay his salary while he
appears in court, his livelihood is jeopardized. Finally, legal fees and
other pre-trial litigation costs raise the ante for the enterprising journal-
ist or news medium that prints a controversial story.5 1
The costly nature of defamation discovery allows the plaintiff with
a spurious claim to punish the journalist and news medium that criti-
cizes him.52  Self-censorship is particularly likely in the case of the
47. See notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text supra.
48. See notes 20-26 and accompanying text supra.
49. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tax. L. REv. 422, 437 (1975). The "full
extent [of self-censorship] is impossible to determine. Much of it is inherently unmeasurable; it
occurs whenever a reporter or editor omits a word, a passage, or an entire story, not for journalis-
tic reasons but because of the possible legal implications." Id. at 430-31.
50. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
51. The cost of defending a full-fledged libel suit probably begins at about $20,000 and
can run much higher, the successful defense of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. is re-
ported to have cost nearly 100,000. ... It is the magnitude of this financial burden,
more than any other factor, that makes libel a threat to the press today.
Anderson, supra note 49, at 435-36. The courts have taken notice of the threat of litigation costs to
the first amendment. In Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 566 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 395 U.S.
922 (1969), the court recognized that "a libel suit might necessitate long and expensive trial pro-
ceedings, which, if not really warranted, [would have a] chilling effect."
52. "[P]otential libel plaintiffs are motivated by something more than a rational calculus of
their chances of recovery; believing they have been wronged, they seek to clear their names and
perhaps to retaliate, and they may be able to accomplish those objectives even if they fail to collect
damages." Anderson, supra note 49, at 435. Of course, harassment suits are not necessarily irra-
tionally motivated. A plaintiff could employ harassment as a valuable deterrent to future criti-
cisms. In Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court recognized the
1034 Vol. 58
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small publisher who would criticize the well-heeled public figure, who
in turn can use litigation costs to whip the publisher into line. Re-
cently, [MORE] magazine, a small opinion journal, reported that it had
deleted much controversial material from an article for fear of litiga-
tion costs. Counsel for the magazine advised that, although [MORE]
would likely prevail on the merits, the costs of a suit would bankrupt
the magazine.53 Although financial ramifications are a lesser influence
when the journalist making the decision works for a prosperous corpo-
rate employer, the journalist will remain tempted to avoid the tremen-
dous personal involvement inherent in defamation discovery. Both in
terms of his personal development and the optimal use of his time for
his employer, pursuit of the story less likely to generate litigation can
be the journalist's more rational choice. 4
The Herbert Court, however, implicitly denied that a first amend-
ment chill analagous to the one prohibited in New York Times was in
issue when it said, "if inquiry into editorial conclusions threatens the
suppression not only of information known or strongly suspected to be
unreliable but also of truthful information, the issue would be quite
different. '55 The Court avoided the issue by reasoning that direct dis-
covery of subjective fault-questioning what the defendant thought-is
no worse than indirect discovery of subjective fault-questioning what
the defendant did in preparing the story.56 Both forms of discovery,
however, provide opportunities for harrassment. While direct discov-
ery entails inquiry into the journalist's "beliefs, opinions, intent and
threat of harassment suits. "For the stake here, if harassment succeeds, is free debate. . . . Un-
less persons, including newspapers, desiring to exercise their First Amendment rights are assured
freedom from the harassment of lawsuits, they will tend to become self-censors." Id. at 968.
Granting summary judgment to defendant, the court in Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union,
[1979] 5 MEDIA L. REP. 1174 (B.N.A.) (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1979), characterized plaintifis motive as
harassment. "In light of the clear and weighty precedent rejecting such an approach, .. . the
suggestion is strong that plaintifi's object in bringing this action is to use this court to discourage
the publication of opposing views." Id. at 1175.
53. Anderson, supra note 49, at 431 (citing Hume, The Mayor, the Times, and the Lawyers,
[MORE], August 1974, at 17).
54. Richard Salant, then President of CBS News, expressed these concerns in reaction to the
Herbert decision. The Mind of a Journalist, TImE, April 30, 1979, at 53-54. These disincentives
are effective because "It]he press has virtually no economic incentive to publish anything that
might lead to a libel suit." Anderson, supra note 49, at 433.
55. 99 S. Ct. at 1647.
56. Since the defendants neither challenged indirect discovery nor offered a compelling dis-
tinction between direct and indirect discovery, the Court considered their position inherently
flawed. See text accompanying note 36 supra. Despite the defendants' tactical decision not to
challenge indirect discovery, however, the Second Circuit position clearly implicates all discovery
of subjective fault.
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conclusions in preparing the program,"57 indirect discovery requires
painstaking scrutiny5" of each step in the preparation of the program
and thus demands from the defendant journalist considerable time, en-
ergy, and finances.59 Nonetheless, the Court refused to confront the
important question whether indirect discovery chills the exercise of first
amendment rights.
The Court also maintained that, even assuming the existence of
some first amendment chill at the discovery stage, there is no effective
method for countering that chill short of abolishing the defamation ac-
tion-a course rejected in New York Times-or making a major proce-
dural reform.6" A special procedure for defamation discovery,
however, can be fashioned to protect first amendment interests without
harming reputational interests and without radically altering the struc-
ture of civil litigation. First, defamation discovery should be bifur-
cated. Upon stating a claim for relief, a plaintiff should be allowed
only that discovery necessary to establish defamatory falsehood.6'
During this first round of discovery, a plaintiff should be allowed to
discover only objective evidence on the issue of defamatory falsehood;
he should not be allowed to canvass a defendant's thoughts, opinions,
or conclusions.62 Furthermore, a plaintiff should not, as a general rule,
be allowed to depose a defendant journalist.63 After this first round of
discovery, a plaintiff should be required to build a prima facie case on
the issue of defamatory falsehood before he is allowed plenary discov-
ery on the issue of subjective fault.
57. 568 F.2d at 982-83.
58. See note 7 supra.
59. See e.g., text accompanying note 18 supra.
60. 99 S. Ct. at 1649. Because the first amendment chill is the result of an imperfection in our
system of civil procedure, the Court reasoned that it should be remedied by a major procedural
reform. Id. There are two reasons, however, for creating a special procedure to remedy the first
amendment chill. First, a major procedural reform might take many years. Something should be
done to protect the exercise of first amendment rights from mushrooming discovery in the long
interim period. Second, efforts to counter the first amendment chill should provide healthy exper-
imentation with the problem of discovery abuse. Techniques successful in protecting the defama-
tion defendant might find more general application later.
61. To recover, the plaintiff must show that the defendant published a defamatory falsehood
concerning the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 613 (1977); see note 69 infra.
62. A limitation on the term "objective evidence" is necessary because the defendant's
thoughts and opinions are relevant to the question of falsity under FED. R. EviD. 401 and admis-
sible under FED. R. EVID. 701.
63. Despite the inadmissibility of the defendant's opinions on the issue of falsity, see Id.,
plaintiffs' attorneys might still depose journalists to examine them about the facts that they uncov-
ered. Allowing such examinations is an invitation to the time-consuming "inquisitions" decried
by the Second Circuit. See text accompanying note 24 supra. The potential for harassment in
such examinations far exceeds their probative value. See notes 66 & 67 and accompanying text
infra.
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The suggested procedure64 eliminates the two major drawbacks of
64. In his Herbert dissent, Justice Brennan suggested that a plaintiff be required to make a
prima facie showing of defamatory falsehood before he discovers any editorial conversations. Jus-
tice Brennan was primarily concerned with maintaining an atmosphere conducive to a sound
editorial process and accurate journalism. See note 46 supra. The procedure proposed in this
Note accomplishes Brennan's goals, but goes further to prevent self-censorship caused by the
threat of extensive discovery. In response to Justice Brennan's suggestion, the Court ruled out two
possible procedural changes. First, the Court considered Brennan's suggestion in its most extreme
application-bifurcated trial-and concluded, apparently on judicial notice, that such a procedure
would be too inefficient. "If this suggestion contemplates a bifurcated trial, first on falsity and
then on culpability and injury, we decline to subject libel trials to such burdensome complications
and intolerable delay." 99 S. Ct. at 1648 n.23. Next, the court treated Brennan's suggestion in its
most nominal manifestation-a mere repetition of assertion made in the complaint:
On the other hand, if, as seems more likely, the prima facie showing does not con-
template a mini-trial on falsity, no resolution of conflicting evidence on this issue, but
only a credible assertion by the plaintiff, it smacks of a requirement that could be satis-
fied by an affidavit or a simple verification of the pleadings. We are reluctant to imbed
this formalism on the Constitution.
Id. The majority, however, misread Justice Brennan's dissent. Brennan apparently contemplated
a scheme somewhere between the poles of Justice White's reductio ad absurdum. He clearly im-
plied that a plaintiff would have to submit evidence to the judge-more than an affidavit or a
verification-when he said "discovery should be adequate to acquire the relevant evidence of
falsehood" to make the prima facie showing. 99 S. Ct. at 1660. Finally, as the procedure pro-
posed here shows, Brennan's suggestion does not necessarily lead to bifurcated trial. Justice Bren-
nan's suggestion inspired The Radio and Television News Directors Association to submit to the
Federal Judicial Conference an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The text of
that amendment, which would establish a procedure similar to that developed in this Note, was
submitted November 29, 1979 as follows:
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-
Rule 26
(g) Defamation andPrivacy Cases. (1) Prior to the commencement of discovery in
any case in which the plaintiff seeks to inquire into matters relevant to the element
of "actual malice" in a defamtion or privacy case, the plaintiff shall so inform the
court prior to the commencement of any discovery, and the court shall direct the
attorneys for the parties to appear before it for an initial conference on the subject of
discovery. Before the conference is convened, the attorney for each party shall file
and serve upon the attorneys for the other parties a discovery proposal containing:
(a) A specific statement of the issues presented by the case as they then ap-
pear,
(b) A proposed plan and schedule of discovery consistent with Rule 26(g)(2);
and
(c) Any additional proposed limitations or other orders with respect to discov-
ery.
Following the discovery conference, the court shall issue an order tentatively identifying the issues
for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and schedule for discovery, setting limitations on dis-
covery, if any; and determining such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are
necessary for the prompt management of discovery in the action.
(2) Unless the defendant agrees to a plaintifis request for discovery on the issue of actual
* If the proposed Rule 26(f) is not finally adopted, the following proposed Rule 26(g)
would be redesignated Rule 26(f) and the reference therein to Rule 26(gX2) would be changed to
rule 26(f)(2). See Proposed Amendments, 80 F.R.D. 323, 330-32 (1979), recommended to the
Supreme Court by the Judicial Conference of the United States on September 20, 1979.
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defamation discovery. First, the requirement of a prima facie showing
screens out litigants with spurious claims before they have the opportu-
nity to run up costs.65  Second, the procedure minimizes the involve-
ment of journalists in defamation discovery. If a plaintiff does not
make a prima facie showing of defamatory falsehood, he cannot en-
gage in the painstaking process of discovering the entire editorial proc-
ess step by step. Furthermore, the objective nature of the first round of
discovery makes depositions generally unnecessary. Unlike the subjec-
tive issues inherent in a defamation action, the objective issues do not
require inquiry into facts peculiarly within the knowledge of a defend-
ant. As a result, a plaintiffs need for deposing a defamation defendant
on the objective issues is far less pressing than the need for such a depo-
sition on the subjective issues that concerned the court in Herbert.
There will be times, however, that a defamation defendant alone has
reasonable access to the evidence necessary for the plaintiff's case on
even the objective issues. Such legitimate needs can be met through the
use of interrogatories and documentary discovery.6 6 Given the objec-
tive nature of the inquiry, the advantages of direct examination over
less personal forms of discovery generally would not merit the personal
involvement of the defendant at this early stage.' Thus, depositions
can justifiably be denied as a general rule, making it impossible for
malice or the defendant requests discovery on that issue, all discovery shall initially be limited to
material relevant to issues other than actual malice. Following completion of such discovery and
upon request by the plaintiff, the court shall evaluate the material adduced through discovery and
any other material in the possession of the plaintiff. If that material would be sufficient, if
presented at trial, to constitute prima facie evidence of all elements of a cause of action, except the
element of actual malice, the court shall permit further discovery upon the issue of actual malice
concerning the defendant's state of mind and/or the editorial process leading to the publication at
issue, so long as the material sought is not otherwise privileged.
65. See note 51 supra.
66. The documents contemplated here are not a journalist's work product, which would be
evidence of subjective fault, but rather documents bearing on the issue of falsity-for instance, the
diary of a third party that implicates the defendant in the activity and that inspired the allegedly
defamatory publication. Of course, it is questionable whether a journalist's work product should
be discoverable even on the issue of subjective fault. Because interrogatories and document re-
quests can also be used to harrass, the court should allow them only when the plaintiff has no
other reasonable way of obtaining the information.
67. "The greatest advantage that an oral deposition has over other methods of discovery is
the flexibility it affords in probing a witness by requiring immediate, on-the-spot answers to oral
questions.. . . The greatest disadvantage of the oral deposition is the expense." F. JAMEs & Co.
HAZARD, CIL PROCEDURE § 6.3 (2d ed. 1977). When the defendant does not have peculiar
knowledge of the facts, the costs of the oral deposition on the objective issues clearly outweigh the
benefits in a first amendment case. Although a defendant is always loath to help a plaintiff build
his case, the incentive to prevaricate or obfuscate is virtually removed when the defendant knows
the plaintiff can prove the facts sought by some other means. The potential for a prejury convic-
tion or severely damaged credibility at trial is sufficient to ensure the accuracy of forms of discov-
ery other than oral depositions. See text accompanying note 75 infa.
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plaintiffs with spurious claims to harass journalists by prying unneces-
sarily into the news-gathering process.
The proposed procedure also satisfies the three criteria applied by
the Herbert Court in rejecting the absolute privilege-sureness of ad-
ministration, compatibility with the vitality of the defamation action,
and precedential support.6 8 First, the procedure is neither unworkably
vague nor too difficult to implement. The component parts-bifurca-
tion of discovery, summary judgment practice, and the directed verdict
standard- are all in use already. Second, the procedure does not sig-
nificantly threaten the ability of the good faith defamation plaintiff to
win a judgment. Unlike the absolute privilege, the procedure does not
rob the plaintiff of any evidence crucial to his case. Also, as Justice
Brennan pointed out in his dissent in Herbert, "Requiring a public
figure plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of defamatory falsehood
will not constitute an undue burden, since he must eventually demon-
strate these elements as part of his case-in-chief."6 9 Finally, there is
significant precedent supporting the validity of the proposed procedure.
Bifurcation of discovery, which is within the discretion of the trial
judge to grant,"0 has been employed to protect defendants from abusive
discovery even when no constitutionally favored activity is impli-
cated.7' The suggested procedural change would merely make bifurca-
tion available to the defamation defendant as a matter of law.
Use of the directed verdict standard of a prima facie showing in
the summary proceeding that is the prerequisite of further discovery in
the proposed bifurcated process is consistent with the summary judg-
ment burden placed on the defamation plaintiff by leading federal cir-
cuits. Recognizing the first amendment chills caused by extensive
discovery and harrassment suits, federal courts have reflexively in-
creased the summary judgment burden on the plaintiff. 2 The sug-
68. See text accompanying notes 28-33 supra.
69. 99 S. Ct. at 1660 (Brennan, J. dissenting). The Supreme Court has not explicitly shifted
the burden of proving falsity to the plaintiff, Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
(reserving the question), but the practical effect of requiring the plaintiff to prove subjective fault
is that he must also show falsity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613, comment j (1977).
70. Justice Powell recognized bifurcation of discovery as a possible remedy in his concur-
rence. "In some instances it might be appropriate for the district court to delay enforcing a discov-
ery demand, in the hope that the resolution of issues through summary judgment or other
developments in discovery might reduce the need for material demanded." 99 S. Ct. at 1651 n.4.
71. Eg., River Plate Corp. v. Forestal Land, Timber & Ry. Co., 185 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
72. Traditional summary judgment doctrine requires the moving party, even if he does not
have the trial proof burden, to prove that he could win a directed verdict at trial. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil § 2713 (1973).
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gested procedure, however, is a refinement of the use of summary
disposition at the pretrial stage as a first amendment safeguard. The
Supreme Court recently commented that the routine granting of sum-
mary judgment against the defamation plaintiff may be inappropriate
because the issue of subjective fault needs full adversarial treatment at
trial.73 The Court's concerns are apparently the same ones that have
caused it to caution against summary judgment in antitrust conspiracy
actions. Considering such an action in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. ," the Court said:
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in
complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading
roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,
and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the witnesses
are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility
and the weight to be given their testimony can be appraised.7"
The proposed procedure avoids these problems because disposition of
objective issues does not depend on evidence peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant.76
Thus, the moving defendant must prove that no reasonable person could find in favor of the
plaintiff's claim, and the plaintiff need make no showing at all until the defendant discharges his
burden. In first amendment cases, however, the trend in the federal courts has been to require
some showing on the part of the non-moving plaintiff even though the defendant does not dis-
charge his heavy burden. C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 2730. Some leading circuits have
shifted the burden to the non-moving plaintiff to prove he could pass a directed verdict at trial. In
Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970). Judge
Wright explained in a concurrence:
In my judgment New York Times Co. v. Sullivan makes actual malice a constitu-
tional issue to be decided in the first instance by the trial judge applying the Times test of
actual knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth. Unless the court finds, on the basis
of pretrial affidavits, depositions, or other documentary evidence, that the plaintiff can
prove actual malice in the Times sense, it should grant summary judgment for the de-
fendant.
Id. at 922 (Wright, J., concurring) (citations omitted). In Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union,
[19791 5 MEDIA L. REP. 1174 (BNA) (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1979), the court said, "On these motions,
the burden is squarely on plaintiff, an admitted public figure, to establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, at least a genuine issue of fact as to whether the articles were published with 'actual
malice' within the meaning of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan." Id. The purpose for the shift of
the burden is discussed at note 52 supra. Placing the burden of making a prima facie showing on
the non-moving plaintiff merely brings summary judgment burdens into line with trial proof bur-
dens. In his analysis of the allocation of summary judgment burdens, Professor Louis argues that
summary judgment burdens should be consistent with trial proof burdens in all civil actions re-
gardless of first amendment implications. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: .A Critical
Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974).
73. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 n.9 (1979).
74. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
75. Id. at 473.
76. Differentiation between the treatment of subjective and objective issues on a motion for
summary judgment is generally accepted. "mhe motion often is granted when the case can be
resolved on issues that do not involve subjective states of mind." C. WRIoHT & A. MILLER, spra
note 72, § 2730 (1977). The writer does not mean to imply that he agrees with Hutchinson v.
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Extensive defamation discovery, sanctioned by the Supreme Court
in Herbert v. Lando, causes self-censorship analogous to that which the
Court had previously held unconstitutional in New York Times. As in
New York Times, a remedy should be fashioned to counteract such
self-censorship. The remedy may be tailored by integrating familiar
concepts of civil procedure-bifurcation of discovery, summary judg-
ment practice, and the directed verdict standard. By allowing discov-
ery on the issue of subjective fault only after a prima facie showing on
the objective issues in a defamation action, litigation costs can be kept
to a minimum and harassment of journalists avoided. This protective
device satisfies all the criteria for a workable remedy set forth by the
Court in Herbert and is a logical compromise between the competing
goals of ensuring the vigorous debate the first amendment was designed
to guarantee and affording good faith defamation plaintiffs the oppor-
tunity for recovery that the Court sought to preserve- in New York
Times.
GREGORY DOUGLAS PORTER
Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 n.9 (1979), see text accompanying note 73, nor that adoption of the
proposed procedure should be coupled with a relaxation of the plaintiffs summary judgment bur-
den on the issue of subjective fault. The proposed procedure may be followed by a motion for
summary judgment on the issue of subjective fault.
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